Murray Gell-Mann
Murray Gell-Mann. The Quark and the Jaguar: adventures in the simple and
the complex. Abacus. 1994.
A brilliant and vastly irritating book. Brilliant because it covers a wide
range of fascinating subjects, with many intriguing new insights. Irritating
because it never seems to go into sufficient depth about any of them.
The book covers two main topics, and tries to integrate them. The section on
quantum mechanics and fundamental particles -- Gell-Mann's original background
-- has some fascinating stuff on the modern "many alternative histories"
interpretation of QM, coarse-graining and entropy, and the link to the
quasi-classical domain. All gripping stuff, and worth a whole (popular) book of
their own. Then the section on Complex Adaptive Systems -- based on Gell-Mann's
more recent work at the Santa Fe Institute, has lots of equally fascinating
insights into evolution, information, complexity,
chaos, self-organisation, adaptation, and so on. But again, tons of interesting
ideas are each compressed into a sentence or two. The text is split, under
headings, into half-page or one-page fragments, each of which could usefully be
expanded almost to chapter length in order to discuss fully the points Gell-Mann
mentions in passing.
The Afterword, announced as a kind of "executive summary" (so why wasn't it
at the beginning?), compresses further the entire book into nine breathlessly
dense pages. However, I felt that the entire book acted as an executive summary
to the book(s) I really want to read. Gell-Mann admits that the book "reaches
into a large number of areas it cannot explore thoroughly or in depth" --
indeed, many of those areas are still subjects of active research -- and that
its purpose is "to stimulate thought and discussion" -- it certainly does that,
but a Further Reading section would have been a welcome addition.
in general ... the behaviour of highly complex
nonlinear systems may exhibit simplicity, but simplicity that is typically
emergent and not obvious at the outset
Rating: 2.5
[ unmissable | great
stuff | worth reading | mind candy | waste of time | unfinishable ]
Contents includes:
- Kinds of complexity
- computational complexity -- how the time taken for a computer
program to run varies with the size of the problem
- algorithmic information content -- (Greg
Chaitin) how much a bit stream can be compressed -- the minimum length
of a description of the string (so at a maximum when the string is its own
minimum description, that is, incompressible, or random)
- effective complexity -- (a system has a regular and a random
component) the length of the description used to describe the regularities
-- hence completely regular and completely random systems both have very
small effective complexity
- depth -- (Charles Bennett) how laborious it is to go from the
highly compressed description to a fully-unwound description of a system
(which is why we tend to use less-deep, partially-unwound, more efficient
descriptions -- we don't always go back to "first principles")
- crypticity -- (Charles Bennett) how laborious it is to go from a
fully-unwound description to a highly compressed description of a system
- Kinds of randomness
- incompressible: a random bit string is incompressible -- it has
maximum algorithmic information content
- stochastic: produced by a chance process, such as tossing a fair
coin -- most stochastic streams will be random(1) but
occasionally, by chance, some will not (a chance long run of heads, for
example)
- pseudo-random: produced by a deterministic computational process,
but so complicated as to be effectively unpredictable, and to appear to
simulate a stochastic process
- A more fundamental science has less "special information" in it.
Chemistry is less fundamental than physics, because it applies only at
temperatures where atoms exist, and you have to ask "chemistry-type" questions
of it. Biology is a lot less fundamental than chemistry, because it has all
the special information of contingent evolution on this planet in it. Less
fundamental sciences are more complex sciences; many of their regularities
arise from the special information, as well as from fundamental laws.
Reductionism focuses on the fundamental laws, not the special information.
- quantum mechanics
- bosons (photons, gravitons, etc) "condense" and build up high densities,
so can behave almost like classical fields (electromagnetism, gravity,
respectively) -- fermions (electrons, etc) "exclude"; they can be described
in terms of fields, but such fields never behave classically
- modern view is based on Hugh Everett's "many worlds" interpretation --
although better called "many alternative histories" -- not on
"observers" and "collapsing wavefunctions"
- coarse-grained histories and decoherence; correlation with the
quasi-classical domain -- fine-grained histories and interference, like the
two slit experiment
- "quark" is pronounced "kwork" -- the line Three quarks for
Muster Mark from Finnegans Wake, that suggests the pronunciation
"kwark", was discovered later.
- pruning the history tree of probabilities when something is correlated
with the quasi-classical domain, in other words "observed" to be a fact, is
like pruning a probability tree when a coin is "observed" to be heads or
tails -- nothing to do with collapsing wavefunctions
- Schrodinger's red herring -- the quantum event is amplified and
correlated with the quasi-classical domain, that is, it becomes a
fact -- so the cat really is either alive or dead -- there is
no quantum interference of two cat states
- individuality perceived when each member of a set needs more bits
to describe it than are needed to enumerate the set -- 6 billion people are
individuals, each needing more than 32 each bits to describe them -- 100
billion stars in the galaxy are not all that individual, to us, at the
current level of detail of our observation
- maximal quasi-classical domain -- the most detail the universe
can be described in without getting quantum interference -- such a
description need not be unique -- if one particular description gives rise
to regularities, a complex adaptive system can arise to "compress" those
regularities -- a CAS that arises to compress the regularities of a
different quasi-classical domain description might not be able to perceive
the regularities of the first: "goblin worlds"
- time and entropy -- time's arrow from the very special
initial condition of the universe -- algorithmic information content also
contributes to entropy
- gateway event: an increase in complexity leads to possibility of
further huge increases in kinds and levels of complexity -- eukaryotes --
multi-celled organisms -- a new technology can be an economic gateway event
- CASs recognise regularities
- superstition: recognising a regularity that is not there --
denial: refusing to recognise one that is there
- art can recognise patterns
not of interest to science, such as metaphors
- how can we achieve the spiritual satisfaction, comfort, social cohesion,
great art, that accompany mythical beliefs, without having to
believe the myths? -- how can we achieve cultural diversity
without parochialism and ethnic conflict?
- there is no such thing as paranormal: if something weird really
does occur, the relevant scientific laws will get changed or updated,
as they were for continental drift, for meteorites, ...
- reasons for maladaption -- other selection pressures, frozen
accidents and windows of maturation, differing timescales
- computer simulation of CASs
- biologically inspired neural nets, genetic algorithms -- what is the
computer equivalent of the CAS human immune system?
- emergence of complex behaviour from simple rules: the rules imply
general regularities, plus individual special regularities -- Thomas Ray's
TIERRA: complex evolutionary behaviour from the
beginning -- more realistic economics: bounded rationality, learning,
inclusion of hard-to-quantify values
- physics: 1st law of thermodynamics, conservation of energy; economics,
keeping track of money -- physics 2nd law: increase of entropy; what is the
economic analog of irreversibility?
- Synthesis, integration and review are skills as important as finding new
knowledge, but are not equally rewarded
reviewed 14 January
2001